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The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) is the leading
international instrument recognising the human rights of children across
all areas of their lives. Amid measures of legal incorporation, giving
constitutional expression to children’s rights represents a high watermark
of legal protection. South Africa was an early mover in this space adopting
a strong children’s rights provision in the 1996 South Africa Constitution
which made children’s rights justiciable as part of a Bill of Rights. Over the
last two decades, an empowered judiciary and an active community of
legal advocates have combined to enable the South African Constitutional
Court to create a body of case-law that has provided leadership globally in
the recognition and enforcement of the constitutional rights of children. 
Against the backdrop of the Convention’s 30th anniversary and increased
emphasis on the legal implementation of children’s rights, this article
reflects on the South African experience of using its Constitution to
advance children’s rights. Using South Africa as a case study, it considers
how the potential associated with giving children’s rights the highest status
in a country’s legal system can be maximised. It identifies the lessons to
be learned from the South African experience before concluding with a
reminder that however dynamic the development of children’s rights law,
the effectiveness of the CRC’s implementation can only ever be measured
by the extent to which it improves children’s enjoyment of their rights. 
1 Introduction
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) is the leading
international instrument recognising the human rights of children across
all areas of their lives. Thirty years after the CRC’s adoption, legal,
political and societal change in the way children are treated continues to
be a challenge.1 At the same time, as states parties continue to take steps
incorporate the CRC’s provisions into national law,2 there is some
1 Multiple edited collections have been published providing a wealth of
analysis on the Convention’s implementation. See for example, Tobin, J.
(ed.) The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. A Commentary. OUP,
2019; Kilkelly, U. and Liefaard, T. (eds) International Human Rights of
Children, Springer, 2018; Ruck, M, Peterson-Badali, M. and Freeman M.
(eds). Handbook of Children’s Rights: Global and Multidisciplinary
Perspectives, Routledge, 2017 and Vandenhole, W, Desmet, E. Reynaert, D.
Lembrechts, S. (eds) The Routledge International Handbook of Children’s
Rights Studies, Routledge, 2015; 
2 Kilkelly, U. “The UN convention on the rights of the child: incremental and
transformative approaches to legal implementation” 23 (2019) The
International Journal of Human Rights 323-337.
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evidence that legal and non-legal measures of implementation have
begun to improve children’s lived experience of their rights.3 
Giving constitutional expression to children’s rights represents a high
watermark of legal protection even if, around the world, practice varies
from instruments that include limited references to the needs of children
to those that recognise children as fully fledged rights holders.4 The
process of constitutionalising children’s rights is complex and dynamic;
it starts with the insertion of children’s rights into the Constitution and
then requires further associated actions to give real meaning to that
change.5 These include measures to promote children’s access to the
courts, provide effective remedies where rights have been violated and
enable the judiciary and the legal profession to interpret and apply these
rights in a progressive manner.6 In truth, there are few examples of
where such approaches have been a success.
South Africa was an early mover in the domestic incorporation of
children’s rights.7 Building on previous instruments, the 1996 South
Africa Constitution contains a strong children’s rights provision – Section
28 – the adoption of which represented a “ground-breaking moment in
the advancement of children’s rights” when for the first time, children’s
rights were “robustly and comprehensively recognized in the express
language of a nation’s constitution”.8 Children’s rights were made
justiciable under the Constitution, making the courts pivotal in the
enforcement of the Bill of Rights.9 While there was scepticism that the
rhetoric would not translate into tangible legal progress for children’s
rights in South Africa,10 early political measures led by President
3 Lundy, L., Kilkelly, U., Byrne, B and Kang, J. The UN Convention on the Rights
of the Child: A study of Legal Implementation in 12 Countries, UNICEF UK,
2012.
4 See in particular, Tobin, J. “Increasingly seen and heard: the constitutional
recognition of children’s rights”, 21 South African Journal on Human Rights
(2005) 86-126; European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice
Commission) Report on the Protection of Children’s Rights: International
Standards and Domestic Constitutions (2014), Opinion n°713 / 2013, para
146, available at www.venice.coe.int and O’Mahony, C. “Constitutional
Protection of Children’s Rights: Visibility, Agency and Enforceability” (2019)
19(3) Human Rights Law Review 1-34.
5 O’Mahony, C. “The Promises and Pitfalls of constitutionalising Children’s
Rights” in Dwyer (ed), Oxford Handbook of Children and the Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2019) 869-864.
6 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 5 (2003),
General measures of implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (arts. 4, 42 and 44, para. 6), 27 November 2003, CRC/GC/2003/5.
7 Binford, W. (2015) “The Constitutionalization of Children’s Rights in South
Africa”, 60 New York Law School Law Review 333-364, 342.
8 Binford, W., 334.
9 Cameron, E and Taylor, M “The untapped potential of the Mandela
Constitution” Public Law (2017) 382-407, at 386.
10 See Sloth-Nielsen, J. “The Contribution of children’s rights to the
reconstruction of society: some implications of the constitutionalisation of
children’s rights in South Africa” 4 International Journal of Children’s Rights
(1996) 323-344, at 324.
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Mandela resulted in “substantial and measurable gains”.11 Over the last
two decades, an empowered judiciary and an active community of legal
advocates have combined to enable the South African Constitutional
Court to create a body of case-law12 that “leads the way in recognizing
and enforcing the constitutional rights of children.13 While progress has
not always been smooth, nonetheless South Africa stands out
internationally as an exemplar of how constitutional law can be used to
advance children’s rights.
Against the backdrop of the Convention’s 30th anniversary and
increased emphasis on the legal implementation of children’s rights, this
article reflects on the South African experience of using its Constitution
to advance children’s rights. Using South Africa as a case study, it
considers how the potential associated with giving children’s rights the
highest status in a country’s legal system can be maximised. The first
part of the article begins by exploring the legal obligations on states
parties to implement the Convention, with specific reference to legal and
constitutional measures. In the second part, the article introduces the
South African case study – the terms of the Constitution and a summary
of the case-law of the South Africa Constitutional Court – in an evaluation
of the extent to which the standards of the Convention and the
recommendations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child have been
given effect. The final part identifies the additional lessons to be learned
from the unique South African experience before concluding with a
reminder that however dynamic the development of children’s rights
law, the effectiveness of the CRC’s implementation can only ever be
measured by the extent to which it improves children’s enjoyment of
their rights. In this respect, South Africa – like many other states parties
- still has some distance to travel.
2 Implementation and Enforcement of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted
by the General Assembly of the United Nations in November 1989.14
Renowned for its comprehensive recognition of the rights of the child,
11 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (1996) “Chicken soup or chainsaws: some implications of
the constitutionalisation of children’s rights in South Africa” Acta Juridica
6-27, at 7.
12 See Skelton, A (2015) “South Africa” in Liefaard, T. and Doek, J.E. (eds)
Litigating the Rights of the Child: The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
in Domestic and International Jurisprudence. Springer, 15; Sloth-Nielsen, J.
and Kruuse, H. (2013) “A maturing manifesto: The constitutionalisation of
children’s rights in South African jurisprudence 2007-2012” 21(4) The
International Journal of Children’s Rights 646-678; see also Sloth-Nielsen, J.
in this volume (TBC) and her references to various relevant sources. 
13 O’Mahony, C. (2019), at 872.
14 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General
Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989. The Convention entered
into force on 2 September 1990, in accordance with article 49.
524    2019 De Jure Law Journal
the CRC provides minimum legal obligations on states parties with
respect to children’s enjoyment of their rights in all areas of their lives.15
The Convention is based on a contemporary view of childhood, where
beyond welfare and paternalism, children are considered to be fully
fledged owners of human rights.16 In line with other instruments of
international human rights law, the CRC shifted the treatment of children
from an approach based on pity or charity, to one which imposed clear
and enforceable legal duties on states parties to vindicate CRC rights.
This is reinforced by Article 4 of the Convention which requires states
parties to take all appropriate legislative, administrative and other
measures to implement the Convention17 and the importance attached
by the Committee on the Rights of the Child to making Convention rights
enforceable in the national legal system. 18 According to the Committee:
“Ensuring that all domestic legislation is fully compatible with the Convention
and that the Convention’s principles and provisions can be directly applied
and appropriately enforced is fundamental.”19
The Committee has highlighted the value of including children’s rights in
national constitutions, while explaining that full implementation of these
rights may require the adoption of legislative and other measures.20
Tobin describes this as a “climate of expectation” that children’s rights
be given constitutional expression,21 rather than anything more
prescriptive and in line with this approach, the Committee has welcomed
(e.g. South Africa)22 and at times strongly encouraged states (e.g. Ireland)
to take such action.23 At the same time, it is difficult to argue that giving
constitutional status to children’s rights is not an “appropriate” measure
of implementation under Article 4.24 When the Committee has
addressed giving constitutional expression to children’s rights, it has
advocated both a rights-based approach and the inclusion of the general
principles (Article 2 on non-discrimination; Article 3 on best interests;
15 Doek, J.E., “The Human Rights of Children: An Introduction” in Kilkelly, U.
and Liefaard, T. (eds). International Human Rights of Children. Springer,
2019, 3-29.
16 Verhellen, E. “The Convention on the Rights of the Child: Reflections from a
historical, social policy and educational perspective”, in Vanderhole et al,
43-59.
17 Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2019), “Monitoring and Implementation of Children’s
Rights” in: Kilkelly, U. and Liefaard, T., 31-64.
18 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General comment no. 5 (2003):
General measures of implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, 27 November 2003, CRC/GC/2003/5, para 19.
19 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2003, para 1. 
20 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2003, para 21.
21 Tobin, J., 90-91.
22 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations of the
Committee on the Rights of the Child: South Africa, CRC/C/15/Add.122, para
3.
23 See UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations:
Ireland CRC/C/15/Add. 85 February 4, 1998, para.25 and UN Committee on
the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Ireland, CRC/ C/IRL/CO/2,
September 29, 2006, para.25.
24 Tobin, J. at 89.
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Article 6 on life, survival and development and Article 12 on the right to
be heard).25 
Similarly, in an analysis of European constitutions, the Council of
Europe’s Venice Commission found that:
“constitutions that express children’s rights in a manner reflecting the
indivisibility of rights, enshrining the general principles of the CRC,
recognising the status of children as rights holders with an entitlement to
have those rights vindicated against the state express the highest forms of
compliance with international norms.”26
Freeman notes that “[r]ights without remedies are of symbolic
importance, no more”27 and for this reason the Committee on the Rights
of the Child has placed significant emphasis on the enforceability of
children’s rights.28 According to the Committee: “[f]or rights to have
meaning, effective remedies must be available to redress violations”.29
Children are thus entitled to appropriate reparation where breaches of
their rights have been found,30 including compensation and, where
appropriate, measures that promote the child’s “physical and
psychological recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration”.31 Because
children’s “special and dependent status creates real difficulties for them
in pursuing remedies for breaches of their rights”, “effective, child-
sensitive procedures” must be made available to children and their
representatives.32 According to the Committee, these must include
“child-friendly information, advice, advocacy, including support for self-
advocacy, and access to independent complaints procedures and to the
courts with necessary legal and other assistance”.33 
While legal measures are integral to the implementation of the CRC,
the Committee has also stressed the importance of non-legal measures,
like those that develop a “children’s rights perspective throughout
Government, parliament and the judiciary”.34 To this end, it has
repeatedly reminded that training and capacity building on children’s
rights for those who work with and for children is integral to the
25 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Ireland,
CRC/C/15/Add. 85 February 4, 1998, para 21.
26 Venice Commission, para 139.
27 Freeman, M. “Why It Remains Important to Take Children’s Rights
Seriously” International Journal of Children’s Rights 15 (2007) 5–23, at 8.
28 See also Tobin, J., at 91
29 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, (2003), para 24.
30 Liefaard, T. (2019) “Access to Justice for Children: Towards a Specific
Research and Implementation Agenda”. 27(2) The International Journal of
Children’s Rights 195-227.
31 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, (2003), para 24.
32 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, (2003), para 24.
33 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, (2003), para 24.
34 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, (2003), para 12. 
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Convention’s effective implementation.35 Such training must be
“systematic and ongoing” and designed to “increase knowledge and
understanding of the Convention.”36 The Committee has singled out the
“judiciary”37 in this context in an important reminder of the essential
role played by the courts in the enforcement of Convention rights.38 
In summary, then, the Committee promotes legal implementation of
the CRC in three core ways: incorporation of the CRC into domestic law,
at constitutional level where possible; making such rights enforceable,
providing remedies where rights are breached, and providing systematic
children’s rights training to those who work in the legal system to
promote the advancement of children’s rights and access to justice. The
next part of this article will examine the extent to which these
requirements have been fulfilled in the South African approach. First,
section 28 of the South African constitution will be introduced. 
3 Section 28 of the South African Constitution: 
meeting the expectations of the CRC 
Following South Africa’s ratification of the CRC on 16 June 1995,39 the
new Constitution of the Republic of South Africa was adopted in 1996,
with a dedicated and detailed section on children’s rights (section 28).40
Situated in Chapter 2 of the Constitution, within a comprehensive Bill of
Rights, the children’s rights provision sits alongside a number of other
provisions – including section 26 on housing, section 27 on healthcare
and section 29 on education – which also apply to children.41 Section 28
on children’s rights is a unique constitutional provision, impressive in its
35 See for example, UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General
comment No. 24 (2019) on children’s rights in the child justice system, 18
September 2019, CRC/C/GC/24, para 39; , UN Committee on the Rights of
the Child, General comment No. 21 (2017) on children in street situations,
21 June 2017 CRC/C/GC/21, paras 18, 40 and UN Committee on the Rights
of the Child, General comment No. 16 (2013) on State obligations regarding
the impact of the business sector on children’s rights, 17 April 2013, CRC/C/
CGC/16, para 61.
36 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (2003), para 53.
37 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (2003), para 53
38 Stalford, H. and Hollingsworth, K. (2017). Judging Children’s Rights. in:
Stalford, H., Hollingsworth, K. and Gilmore, S. (eds), Rewriting Children’s
Rights Judgments. From Academic Vision to New Practice, Bloomsbury, p.
21ff.
39 See the United Nations Treaty Database, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en (last
visited 17 June 2019). Skelton, A. (2015) in Liefaard, T. and Doek, J.E, 14.
40 As adopted on 8 May 1996 and amended on 11 October 1996 by the
Constitutional Assembly. For a brief drafting history see Sloth Nielsen, J.
(1996), 325-328.
41 Skelton, A. (2015), In Liefaard, T. and Doek, J.E. 14 with reference to
Friedman, A. Pantazis A., and Skelton, A. (2009). Children’s Rights. In:
Woolman, S., Roux, T. and Bishop, M. (eds). Constitutional law of South
Africa, Cape Town: Juta, pp. 41.1-36).
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simplicity and its scope. It recognises the child’s rights: to name and
nationality (section 28(1)(a)), family and alternative care (section
28(1)(b)), basic nutrition and healthcare (section 28(1)(c), protection
from exploitation and abuse (section 28(1)(e)-(f)) and protection from the
arbitrary detention (section 28(1)(g)). In line with Article 1 of the CRC,
section 28(3) defines a child as a person under 18 years and in requiring
that a child’s best interests are of “paramount importance in every
matter concerning the child”, section 28(2) of the Constitution goes
beyond the CRC standard (article 3(1) of which requires that a child’s best
interests are “a primary consideration”).42 Significantly, Section 28(1)(h)
provides children with the additional safeguard of the right to be assigned
a legal practitioner at state expense in civil proceedings affecting the
child, if substantial injustice would otherwise result”. This is a unique
provision which reinforces the child as a legal actor and in contemplating
the child’s participation in civil proceedings, reflects an early and
progressive understanding of children’s access to justice.43 
By any measure, the content of section 28 is impressive. Judged
against the standards of the CRC, and the Committee’s recommendation
that such provision must be right-based, Tobin notes that the
entitlements in the provision “are canvassed in the language of rights and
clearly draw their inspiration from the Convention”.44 In terms of
substantive content, the breadth of section 28 is strong insofar as it gives
expression to a number of socio-economic and civil and political rights,
without caveat or condition, reflecting the political consensus that
surrounded the adoption of section 28.45 The choice of rights appears
firmly rooted in the South Africa experience – with emphasis on the
child’s survival rights of nutrition and shelter for example and more
detailed references to the child’s right to protection from the harms of
economic exploitation and armed conflict.46 It is with respect to the
Committee’s recommendation, that states parties incorporate the
Convention’s general principles in their national constitutions, that the
provision falls short however. The key elements of the Convention’s
principles in Article 2 (non-discrimination) and Article 6 (right to life,
survival and development) can be found elsewhere in the Bill of Rights
(e.g. section 9 on equality and section 11 on the right to life as well as in
the references in sections 28 and 29 to the cornerstones of the child’s
development). Thus, the only CRC principle given explicit protection in
the Bill of Rights is the best interests of the child. As noted above, section
42 See Bonthuys, E. “The Best Interests of the Child in the South African
Constitution” (2006) 20(1) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family
23-43, 32-33.
43 See generally Liefaard, T. (2019) “Access to Justice for Children: Towards a
Specific Research and Implementation Agenda”. 27(2) The International
Journal of Children’s Rights 195-227.
44 Tobin, J., at 112.
45 Sloth-Nielsen, J., (1996), at 326.
46 These provisions also reflected the emphasis in the African Charter on the
Rights and Welfare of the Child ratified by South Africa in 2000. See further
Binford, at 344-347.
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28(2) requires that the child’s best interests are of “paramount
importance in every matter concerning the child”, representing a
stronger formulation than the “primary consideration” approach set out
in Article 3 of the CRC. While it is positive that section 28 gives
constitutional expression to the best interests principle, there have been
concerns, evident in the case-law, about its interplay with the other
provisions.47 Moreover, the absence of the child’s participation rights is
a significant omission from section 28, which makes no reference to the
child’s right to be heard in all matters that affect him/her as required by
Article 12(1) of the CRC. It is very welcome that section 28(1)(h)
recognises that the child has a right to legal representation in civil
proceedings, if “substantial injustice” would otherwise result.48 This
echoes the reference to legal representation in Article 12(2) of the
Convention. At the same time, the absence of the substantive right of
participation means that section 28 falls short of the Committee’s
recommendations in this area. The articulation of civil rights
(unspecified), that apply to children in the other provisions of the Bill of
Rights, has been said to create an expectation for the participation of
children in political decision-making.49 However true, this is a poor
substitute for including in the Constitution a child specific right to
participation along the lines of 12. Perhaps, a more substantive
amelioration of this deficit can be found in section 39(1)(b) of the
Constitution, which requires the courts to take account of international
law in its interpretation of the Bill of Rights. This gives ample scope to the
Constitutional Court to draw on the provisions of the CRC and indeed
other instruments such as the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare
of the Child to strengthen section 28.50 The impact of this provision is
considered further below. 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has made clear that
constitutional expression of children’s rights is of little value without
effective mechanisms in place to provide for their enforcement and it is
here that the South African Constitution hits the higher water mark of
international comparison. In particular, section 7(2) of the South Africa
Constitution requires the state to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the
rights in the Bill of Rights and section 38 secures the enforcement of
these rights before a court, with an entitlement to secure appropriate
relief from a court where rights have been breached. 51 The justiciability
47 See Bonthuys, E. (2006); Skelton, A. (2018). “Child Justice in South Africa:
Application of International Instruments in the Constitutional Court”. 26(3)
The International Journal of Children’s Rights 391-422.
48 On aspects of its implementation see Stewart, L. “Resource constraints and
a child’s right to legal representation in civil matters at state expense in
South Africa” 19 The International Journal of Children’s Rights (2011) 295-
320.
49 Viviers, (2012) A. and Lombard, A. “The ethics of children’s participation:
Fundamental to children’s realisation in Africa” 56(1) International Social
Work 7-21
50 On the use of this provision, see further Skelton, A. (2018).
51 Skelton, A. (2015), at 13.
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and remedy provisions mean that the South Africa Constitution clearly
meets the Committee’s expectations in this respect.52 It also appears to
meet the standards set by the Venice Commission which has
recommended that Council of Europe member states put in place
efficient mechanisms, judicial and non-judicial, to remedy possible
violations of children’s rights.53 
Compared internationally, the children’s rights provisions in the South
African Constitution are impressive in both substance and enforceability.
Tobin’s analysis of the world’s constitutions concludes, with respect to
South Africa, that there are few jurisdictions where children’s rights enjoy
such explicit protection and fewer still where such rights are justiciable.54
O’Mahony, whose assessment of the children’s rights provisions of the
world’s constitutions according to a typology of visibility, agency and
enforceability, concludes that “South Africa offers the clearest example
internationally of a constitution that scores highly on all three
spectrums”.55 On paper, in almost every material respect, therefore, the
South Africa model of constitutional incorporation of children’s rights
sets the bar high, and thus explicitly echoes the Committee’s
recommendations on giving constitutional expression to children’s rights
at national level and doing so on an enforceable rights-basis. The next
section of this paper goes on to consider the extent to which this potential
has been realised with respect to the development of children’s rights
jurisprudence by the Constitutional Court and considers in addition what
additional lessons can be learned from the South African experience.
4 Realising the potential of section 28 from a 
children’s rights perspective: the case-law of 
the Constitutional Court
There is now extensive case-law from the South Africa Constitutional
Court on children’s rights matters, with equally comprehensive academic
analysis of its merits and scope.56 Rather than repeating this analysis
52 Tobin, J. at 119.
53 Venice Commission, para 146.
54 Venice Commission.
55 O’Mahony, C. (2019) (in press).
56 See, for example, Sloth-Nielsen, J, in this volume. (TBC); Centre for Child
Law (2018). 20 Years of Imagining Children Constitutionally – Strategic
Litigation and Advocacy for Children’s Rights in South Africa. Pretoria;
Skelton, A. (2018); Skelton, A. (2015); Sloth-Nielsen, J. and Kruuse, H.;
Sloth-Nielsen, J. and Mezmur, B., “2 =2=5: Exploring the Domestication of
the CRC in South African Jurisprudence (2002-2006)”. 16(1) The
International Journal of Children’s Rights (2008) 1-28; Robinson, JA,
“Children’s Rights in the South-African Constitution 6(1) Potchefstroom
Electronic Law Journal (2003) 1-58; and Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2002). “Children’s
rights in the South African courts: An overview since ratification of the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child”. 10(2) The International Journal of
Children’s Rights, 137-156. 
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here, this article seeks to draw on the literature to review the children’s
rights case-law from the perspective of the Committee’s guidance on
Convention implementation. 
The first question to address is whether the South Africa case-law
reflects a rights-based approach to the determination of children’s issues.
By all accounts, the first decade of South African constitutional
jurisprudence was disappointing in this respect. According to Sloth-
Nielsen, claims under section 28 in the early years of the Constitutional
Court focused mainly on the rights of parents.57 She observes that, in the
initial constitutional litigation, children were largely invisible and their
constitutional rights were “largely … harnessed by adults in pursuit of
their own claims” whereas “children’s individual interests” did not take
“centre stage”.58 Identifying one reason for this emphasis, Justice Albie
Sachs criticized the practice of failing to hear the voices of the child. In
his postscript to the 2000 case Christian Education South Africa v Minister
of Education Justice Sachs posited that although the state and the parents
were in a position to speak on behalf of children, “neither was able to
speak in their name”. Denying the children a curator ad litem, who could
have made sensitive enquiries, children voices were not heard. Had they
been included, Justice Sachs observed, “[children’s] actual experiences
and opinions … would have enriched the dialogue, and the factual and
experiential foundations for the balancing exercise in this difficult matter
would have been more secure”.59 The absence of the participation
principle (article 12) from section 28 was arguably being keenly felt here.
There were also substantive outcomes that were regarded as
disappointing from a children’s rights perspective. Principal among these
was the Grootboom case in which the Constitutional Court took a
restrictive approach to the justiciability of the child’s rights under section
28(1)(c) of the Constitution (to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care
services and social services).60 Here, the Court held that section 28 does
not create “any primary obligation to provide shelter on demand to
parents and their children if children are being cared for by their parents
or families”.61 Accordingly, the Court ruled that “there was no obligation
upon the state to provide shelter to those of the respondents who were
children and, through them, their parents in terms of section 28(1)(c)”.62
This ruling was heavily criticised for denying children “a preferential
57 Sloth-Nielsen, J, in this volume. (TBC) with reference to Christian Education
South Africa v Minister of Education (CCT4/00) [2000] ZACC 11; 2000 (4) SA
757; 2000 (10) BCLR 1051.
58 Sloth-Nielsen, J. in volume (TBC); see also Sloth-Nielsen, J. (2002).
59 Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education (CCT4/00) [2000]
ZACC 11; 2000 (4) SA 757; 2000 (10) BCLR 1051 at 53.
60 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and
Others (CCT11/00) [2000] ZACC 19; 2001 (1) SA 46; 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (4
October 2000).
61 Grootboom, at 77.
62 Grootboom, at 79.
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claim to resources” which some suggested represented the true meaning
of section 28(1)(c).63 
As the first decade of the 1996 Constitution came to an end, however,
the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court began increasingly to
recognise children’s interests as self-standing, requiring independent
consideration.64 Cases such as Centre for Child Law v Minister for Home
Affairs65 on the interests of migrant children in detention, AD v DW,66 on
intercountry adoption, De Reuck v DPP, 67 which upheld the ban on
possession of child pornography in children’s best interests, and Brandt
v S,68 which concerned sentencing of children and the (restrictive) use of
deprivation of liberty in this regard, all pointed to a shift in the Court’s
approach towards a recognition of the child’s status as an autonomous
rights holder.69 At the same time, there was an ongoing tension evident
in the case-law of the Constitutional Court between the desire to offer
children protection on the one hand and to recognize their autonomy on
the other.70
Importantly, especially in light of the above critique of section 28 in
this respect, Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur noted that the Court’s shift
towards a more rights-based approach was accompanied by children’s
views being taken into account.71 Legal representation for children and
the appointment of curators (ad litem) or amicus curiae to represent the
interests of children during the legal proceedings played a significant role
in the promotion of a greater child-rights approach in the litigation.72 A
notable increase in public interest litigation, especially under the
leadership of the Centre for Child Law,73 sometimes including children’s
63 Sloth-Nielsen, J. in volume (TBC); see also Nolan, A. (2017). “Commentary
on Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom” in:
Stalford, H., Hollingsworth, K. and Gilmore, S. (eds), Rewriting Children’s
Rights Judgments. From Academic Vision to New Practice, Bloomsbury,
311-318.
64 Sloth-Nielsen, J. and Mezmur, B. (2008)..
65 Centre for Child law and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others
2005 (6) SA 50 (T).
66 AD and Another v DW and Others (CCT48/07) [2007] ZACC 27; 2008 (3) SA
183 (CC); 2008 (4) BCLR 359 (CC).
67 De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions (Witwatersrand Local Division)
and Others (CCT5/03) [2003] ZACC 19; 2004 (1) SA 406 (CC); 2003 (12)
BCLR 1333 (CC).
68 Brandt v S 2004 JOL 1322 (SCA).
69 Sloth-Nielsen, J. in volume (TBC).
70 See Sloth-Nielsen, J. in volume (TBC); see also later Teddy Bear Clinic for
Abused Children and Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Development and Another (CCT 12/13) [2013] ZACC 35; 2013 (12) BCLR
1429 (CC); 2014 (2) SA 168 (CC); 2014 (1) SACR 327 (CC).
71 Sloth-Nielsen, J. and Mezmur, B. (2008).
72 Jonas highlights in this respect how “practices and experiences of South
Africa where amicus participation has resulted in the phenomenal growth
of constitutional jurisprudence.” See Jonas, O. “The participation of the
amicus curiae institution in human rights litigation in Botswana and South
Africa: a tale of two jurisdictions” 59(2) Journal of African Law (2015)
329-354.
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direct involvement,74 has over the years had a transformative effect on
the substance, as well as the outcome of constitutional jurisprudence on
children’s rights issues. This is perhaps best illustrated by the landmark
case of S v. M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae)75 and the following
dictum of Justice Albie Sachs: 
“Individually and collectively all children have the right to express themselves
as independent social beings, to have their own laughter as well as sorrow, to
play, imagine and explore in their own way, to themselves get to understand
their bodies, minds and emotions, and above all to learn as they grow how
they should conduct themselves and make choices in the wide social and
moral world of adulthood. And foundational to the enjoyment of the right to
childhood is the promotion of the right as far as possible to live in a secure
and nurturing environment free from violence, fear, want and avoidable
trauma.”76
Another strong example, highlighting the potent nature of section 28, is
reflected in the following statement from Justice Cameron in Centre for
Child Law v Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development and Others:
“The rights the provision secures are not interpretive guides. They are not
merely advisory. Nor are they exhortatory. They constitute a real restraint on
Parliament. And they are an enforceable precept determining how officials
and judicial officers should treat children.”77
Sloth-Nielsen and Kruuse note, with reference to both Justice Sachs’ and
Justice Cameron’s dicta, that “South African courts had begun to
construct an image of the “constitutional child”, which no longer only
focused on children’s protection, but included emancipatory elements
and a recognition of autonomy rights.78 Skelton suggests that this case-
law achieved a balance in “[t]he approach to children in (South Africa)
litigation encompasses both the need to protect children and advance
their [autonomy] rights”79 while Sloth-Nielsen similarly concluded that
that in the South Africa case-law, “[c]hildren’s rights had been employed
both as a sword (…) and as a shield”.80 
Despite this progress, however, the Constitutional Court has continued
to be criticised for reaching for the best interests principle under section
73 See Centre for Child Law (2018).
74 See e.g. Centre for Child Law v Hoerskool Fochville 2016 2 SA 121 (SCA), as
cited in Sloth-Nielsen, J. in volume (TBC).
75 S v M (CCT 53/06) [2007] ZACC 18; 2008 (3) SA 232 (CC); 2007 (12) BCLR
1312 (CC).
76 S v M (CCT 53/06) [2007] ZACC 18; 2008 (3) SA 232 (CC); 2007 (12) BCLR
1312 (CC), para. 19.
77 Centre for Child Law v Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development
and Others (CCT98/08) [2009] ZACC 18; 2009 (2) SACR 477 (CC) ; 2009 (6)
SA 632 (CC); 2009 (11) BCLR 1105 (CC), para. 25.
78 Sloth-Nielsen, J. and Kruuse, H, at 671ff.
79 Skelton, A. (2017) Chapter 11: Constitutional protection of Children’s
Rights. In: Boezaart, T. (ed) Child Law in South Africa, Juta, at 358, as cited
by Sloth-Nielsen, J. in volume (TBC).
80 Sloth-Nielsen, J. in volume (TBC).
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28(2) when substantive rights would be more consistent with a rights-
based Convention-compliant view.81 Apart from the concern that the
courts prefer the more woolly, paternalistic “best interests” principle to
an approach that underscores children as the holders of rights, Skelton
highlights that this approach deprives children’s rights under the
Constitution of more explicit consideration and elaboration from the
courts.82 Perhaps this reflects the tension evident in the children’s rights
literature between “interests” and “rights”,83 which the Committee on
the Rights of the Child has also tried to address.84 At the same time,
Sloth-Nielsen remarks that the best interests principle has been
developed into “a constitutional right, rule of procedure, and a principle”
under section 28, meaning that it is “hardly an empty vessel any
longer”.85 This is a very good illustration of how working through
children’s rights issues in the national courts can help to further
theoretical thinking about the implementation of children’s rights
principles. Here, as in other areas, the Constitutional Court has shone a
light on how a balance can be struck between protection and welfarism
on the one hand, and autonomy, emancipation and participation on the
other.86 
Reflective of the comprehensive nature of the Convention, which
recognises children’s rights in all areas of their lives, academic analyses
of the case-law also highlight the breadth of children’s rights issues
considered by the Constitutional Court over the years. In their analysis of
the Court’s jurisprudence, Sloth-Nielsen and Kruuse observe that during
2008 and 2013 the case-law tended to be dominated by issues, among
others, on the right to dignity of the child,87 the right to education88 and
81 Skelton, A. (2018); cf. Couzens, M.M. (forthcoming), The application of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child by national courts, PhD
dissertation Leiden University; see also Vandenhole, W. (2015). Belgium. In:
Liefaard, T. and Doek, J.E. (eds)., 105-122, who shows that this is an issue
of concern elsewhere as well.
82 Skelton, A. (2018).
83 See for example, Kilkelly, U. “The Best interests of the Child: A Gateway to
Children’s Rights”, in Sutherland, E. and Barnes Macfarlane, LA,
Implementing Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child, Cambridge University Press, 2016, 51-66.
84 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General comment No. 14 (2013) on
the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary
consideration (art. 3, para. 1), CRC/C/GC/14, 29 May 2013.
85 Sloth-Nielsen, J. in volume (TBC) with reference to Couzens, M.M.
(forthcoming),
86 See e.g. the closing remarks of Sloth-Nielsen in Sloth-Nielsen, J. in volume
(TBC).
87 See e.g. S v M (CCT 53/06) [2007] ZACC 18; 2008 (3) SA 232 (CC); 2007 (12)
BCLR 1312 (CC), para. 18 in which the court held that “[e]very child has his
or her own dignity” and that “[i]f a child is to be constitutionally imagined
as an individual with a distinctive personality, and not merely as a
miniature adult waiting to reach full size, he or she cannot be treated as a
mere extension of his or her parents, umbilically destined to sink or swim
with them”.
88 Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay 2011 8 BCLR 761
(CC). 
534    2019 De Jure Law Journal
the availability of the required resources for children’s implementation
and remedies in this regard.89 Throughout its history, however, the South
African Constitutional Court has considered an impressive range of
important children’s rights issues. For instance, it has considered
children’s rights in the family, including the right to parental or family
care,90 the court review of decisions to remove children from their
families,91 international child abduction,92 intercountry adoption93 and
surrogacy.94 Very recently, the Constitutional Court declared the
common law defence of reasonable chastisement unconstitutional95 but
it has also considered the child’s right to protection from harm in cases
concerning child pornography,96 the right to be protected against
corporal punishment97 and against abuse,98 the right to dignity of the
child99 and the protection of child victims.100 The Court has also
developed jurisprudence on sensitive issues, such as the rights of
children accused of criminal offences, including the prosecution of
children for consensual sexual activity101 and the right of child sex
offenders to be protected from automatic placement on the sex
offenders register.102 While not limited to children’s rights, the Court has
89 Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister for Justice and
Constitutional Development and Others (CCT 36/08) [2009] ZACC 8; 2009 (4)
SA 222 (CC); 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC); 2009 (7) BCLR 637 (CC). See further
Sloth-Nielsen, J. and Kruuse, H. (2013); see also Sloth-Nielsen, J. in volume
(TBC).
90 S v M (CCT 53/06) [2007] ZACC 18; 2008 (3) SA 232 (CC); 2007 (12) BCLR
1312 (CC).
91 C and Others v Department of Health and Social Development, Gauteng and
Others (CCT 55/11) [2012] ZACC 1; 2012 (2) SA 208 (CC); 2012 (4) BCLR 329
(CC).
92 Sonderup v Tondelli and Another (CCT53/00) [2000] ZACC 26; 2001 (2) BCLR
152; 2001 (1) SA 1171.
93 AD and Another v DW and Others (CCT48/07) [2007] ZACC 27; 2008 (3) SA
183 (CC); 2008 (4) BCLR 359 (CC)
94 See e.g. AB and Another v Minister of Social Development [2016] ZACC 43.
95 Freedom of Religion South Africa v Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Development and Others [2019] ZACC 34.
96 De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions (Witwatersrand Local Division) and
Others (CCT5/03) [2003] ZACC 19; 2004 (1) SA 406 (CC); 2003 (12) BCLR
1333 (CC).
97 Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education (CCT4/00) [2000]
ZACC 11; 2000 (4) SA 757; 2000 (10) BCLR 1051 (18 August 2000).
98 Geldenhuys v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others (CCT 26/08)
[2008] ZACC 21; 2009 (2) SA 310 (CC); 2009 (1) SACR 231 (CC); 2009 (5)
BCLR 435 (CC).
99 Centre for Child Law v Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development and
Others (CCT98/08) [2009] ZACC 18; 2009 (2) SACR 477 (CC) ; 2009 (6) SA
632 (CC); 2009 (11) BCLR 1105 (CC).
100 Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister for Justice and
Constitutional Development and Others (CCT 36/08) [2009] ZACC 8; 2009 (4)
SA 222 (CC); 2009 (2) SACR 130 (CC); 2009 (7) BCLR 637 (CC).
101 Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children and Another v Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development and Another (CCT 12/13) [2013] ZACC 35; 2013
(12) BCLR 1429 (CC); 2014 (2) SA 168 (CC); 2014 (1) SACR 327 (CC).
102 J v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Another [2014] ZACC 13; see
also Zita Hansungule, Protecting Child Offenders’ Rights. Testing the
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developed extensive jurisprudence on the Constitution’s socio-economic
provisions addressing the child’s rights to housing, healthcare and
education and rights to social assistance and inheritance have also been
litigated during this time.103 
Case-law by its nature is incremental and it is evident that the
Constitutional Court has been growing in stature and reach since its
establishment under the 1996 Constitution. While not necessarily limited
to the Constitutional Court (the focus of this present analysis), Sloth-
Nielsen concludes that, over the years, children’s rights scholars have
detected a “growing insertion of children’s rights considerations in
increasingly diverse areas of legal interaction”, reflecting the increased
attention to children’s rights in areas to which they were perhaps not
previously considered relevant.104 It is evident that the role of amicus
curiae, especially South Africa’s Centre for Child Law, had the effect of
shining a children’s rights light on cases involving and affecting children
so that the Constitutional and indeed other courts could better see them
from this perspective. 
The scope of South Africa’s children’s rights jurisprudence is
impressive, especially insofar as it extends way beyond traditional family
and child law matters, into complex and sensitive areas of children’s
rights such as those highlighted above. Although no one factor has
enabled this success, the expression of children’s rights in the South
Africa Constitution and the establishment of the Constitutional Court
with a powerful mandate to enforce those rights have been essential
ingredients. Requiring the Court to draw on international instruments
like the Convention on the Rights of the Child has been instrumental at
times in ensuring that the jurisprudence aligned with South Africa’s
international obligations. Skelton and others note that the CRC and the
ACRWC have been key influences on the Court where they have
informed the South African jurisprudence in line with the Bill of Rights’
interpretive clause (section 39).105
It is also clear that the power to interpret and apply the national
constitution has led to children’s rights becoming embedded in the
domestic legal system. These observations reflect the findings of other
international research that has highlighted the benefits to children of
“bringing rights home”.106 In this way, the South African example
102 constitutionality of the National Register for sex offenders, SA Crime
Quarterly, December 2014 (http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/sacq.v50i1.3).
103 For examples see the Grootboom case referred to earlier; see also Sloth-
Nielsen, J. in volume (TBC) on the case law (also from other courts than the
constitutional court) regarding education; see furthermore Skelton, A.
(2017), at 346-347, as cited by Sloth-Nielsen, J. in volume (TBC).
104 Sloth-Nielsen, J. in volume (TBC).
105 Skelton, A. (2015).
106 See Lundy, L., Kilkelly, U., Byrne, B and Kang, J.; Sandberg, K. (2014). “The
Role of National Courts in Promoting Children’s Rights: The Case of
Norway” 22(1) The International Journal of Children’s Rights 1-20 and
Couzens, M.M. (forthcoming),
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illustrates the value of permitting, if not requiring, the courts to draw on
international and regional law in their interpretation of domestic
children’s rights provisions showing how such approaches can bring a
different perspective or a different frame of reference at times.107 A
strong feature of the South Africa experience is that these approaches
can be stimulated by strategies of public interest litigation, such as that
conducted by the Centre for Child Law, which test the boundaries of legal
standing and amicus curiae participation to promote greater access to
justice for children. But regardless of the strength of the legal provision
and the determination of the litigating parties, it is only with a responsive
and informed judiciary, willing to explore new avenues, that real change
in children’s rights protections can come about. For over two decades
now, the South African Constitutional Court has led the development of
a “climate” favourable to children’s rights and children’s rights
litigation.108 This has not only contributed to specific case-law to
advance children’s rights at a domestic level, 109 it has also influenced
and inspired the promotion of children’s rights and children’s rights
litigation internationally.110 The South African experience clearly
highlights that those who litigate, advocate and campaign for children’s
rights, individually or collectively, play a vital supportive role in the
Convention’s implementation.111
5 Lessons from the South Africa Constitutional 
experience 
The preceding analysis shows that South Africa is an exemplar of
constitutional incorporation of children’s rights, in line with the
requirements of the Convention and the guidance of the Committee on
the Rights of the Child. The final section of this article reflects on what
lessons can be learned from South Africa’s constitutional history in order
to better protect children’s rights in other jurisdictions. 
Strength of constitutional expression 
As noted above, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has
recommended that where children’s rights are given constitutional
expression, this should include references to the Convention’s general
107 See section 38 of the Constitution; Skelton, 2015, pp. 15-17, with reference
to Sloth-Nielsen, J. and Mezmur, B. (2008)., among others.
108 Skelton, A. (2015), at 13.
109 See Sloth-Nielsen, J, in this volume. (TBC); Centre for Child Law (2018);
Skelton, A. (2015).
110 See Skelton, A. (2015), at 14 with reference to Alston, P. and Tobin, J.
(2005). Laying the Foundations for Children’s Rights. Florence: UNICEF
Innocenti Research Centre.
111 See generally Liefaard, T. and Doek, J.E. (eds) (2015). Litigating the Rights of
the Child: The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in Domestic and
International Jurisprudence, Springer; Kilkelly, U. (2011) “The CRC at 21:
Assessing the Legal Impact”. Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, 62 (2):143-
152.
  Legal implementation of the UNCRC   537
principles. Despite the absence of the CRC’s participation principle,
section 28 nonetheless stands out, in international terms, as a weighty
constitutional provision whose detail goes far beyond what the
Committee has recommended in other ways.112 O’Mahony notes for
instance there are few, if any, national constitutions that contain the level
of detail found in the Constitution of South Africa.113 
With respect to the Committee’s recommendation that constitutional
expression of children’s rights must be rights-based, it is significant that,
compared with other constitutions, the South African provision is framed
unequivocally in rights language. Section 28(1) begins with the phrase:
“every child has the right to …” and thereafter the provision mirrors the
approach of the Convention by reinforcing the child’s status as an
autonomous rights-holder.114 It is significant too that this appears to
have played an important role in the Court’s interpretation and
application of section 28 where it draws on the unequivocal rights
language in the provision to impose clear obligations on national
authorities to vindicate the rights of the child. The fact that the
Constitution includes both socio-economic rights (see the references to
nutrition, shelter and health care) and civil and political rights (see the
right to name and nationality), reflecting the commitment in the
Convention to a comprehensive and holistic view of the rights of the child
has also been significant in scaffolding the development of a
comprehensive body of jurisprudence. By any analysis, then, the breadth
of children’s rights jurisprudence from the Constitutional Court has been
enabled, in the first instance, by the Constitution’s detailed,
comprehensive and rights-based children’s rights provision. 
Enforceability and remedies for the breach of children’s rights
The second notable element of the South Africa experience is the power
that the South African Constitutional Court has to enforce section 28,
using a range of remedies when children’s rights are breached. As noted
above, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has recommended that
enforcement is key to the meaningful protection of children’s rights at
national level, noting that reparation is key to the vindication of these
rights. As considered here and elsewhere, the case-law of the
Constitutional Court is wide-ranging and dynamic, addressing a
multitude of children’s rights issues. In one sense, there can be no better
evidence of the fact that section 28 did indeed provide the Court with
solid platform on which to build the constitutional law on children’s
rights. Crucially, however, this case-law goes beyond theoretically
interesting or erudite analyses of the law. The Court also, in numerous
112 Tobin, J. (2005); Habashi et al., (2010) “Constitutional Analysis: A
Proclamation of Children’s Right to Protection, Provision, and
Participation”, 18 International Journal of Children’s Rights 267.
113 See O’Mahony, C. (2019) (in press).
114 Doek, J.E. (2019), The Human Rights of Children: An Introduction, in:
Kilkelly, U. and Liefaard, T. (eds). International Human Rights of Children.
Springer, pp. 3-29. 
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cases provided remedies for children – individually and collectively –
whose rights were breached, going beyond providing reparation to
individual children to the choice of remedies that go to the heart of
children’s enjoyment of their rights. Remedies have included the striking
down of legislation and ordering compensation for wrongful detention,
while also including more creative measures such as requiring child-
friendly interpretation of national law, not to mention the substantial
gains achieved through out of court settlements and agreements.115 This
flexible approach to remedies for the breach of children’s rights
demonstrates how litigating children’s rights can be used to benefit
children beyond those participating in the litigation, to the advantage of
children more generally, all the time staying true to the ultimate goal of
vindicating children’s rights, meeting children where they are in this
process. 
Legal training and the awareness of children’s rights
The third important element of the South Africa experience, again
drawing on the recommendations of the Committee on the Rights of the
Child, has been the existence among the senior judiciary of those with
knowledge and awareness of children’s rights. As noted above, the
Committee has identified that children’s rights training for judges is vital
for the implementation of the Convention and frequently reminds states
parties of the importance of building capacity and raising awareness of
those who work with and for children in the legal system. International
studies have illustrated the importance of judicial training in the
successful implementation of the Convention116 and significantly, when
the Committee examined the first periodic report of South Africa under
Article 44 of the Convention, it welcomed the integration of human rights
into the training curriculum for magistrates, and other officials
concerned with the administration of justice.117 In 2016, when it next
considered South Africa implementation, it specifically welcomed “the
progressive application by the judiciary, in the state party’s
jurisprudence, of the rights and principles stipulated in the
Convention”.118 While the role of skilled lawyers has been instrumental
in the development in South Africa of an innovative body of children’s
rights law, it is the combination of this expertise with the demonstrated
awareness of and commitment to children’s rights by the Constitutional
Court that allowed the development of such progressive and expansive
children’s rights jurisprudence in South Africa. In this respect, South
Africa offers a very important illustration of the impact of judicial training
115 Sloth-Nielsen, J. in this volume.
116 See Lundy, L. Kilkelly, U., Byrne, B and Kang, J. (2012);  See also Liefaard, T.
and Doek, J.E. (eds) (2015).
117 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations of the
Committee on the Rights of the Child: South Africa, CRC/C/15/Add.122,
(2000) para 5.
118 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations of the
Committee on the Rights of the Child: South Africa, CRC/C/ZAF/CO/2, (2016)
para 5.
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– a specific recommendation of the Committee on the Rights of the Child
– on the legal advancement of children’s rights at national level. 
6 Conclusion
From the perspective of the expression and enforcement of children’s
rights, the South African story is overwhelmingly positive – a strongly
worded constitutional provision, whose justiciability has been exploited
by skilled lawyers before a progressive judiciary willing to use all the
powers of the Constitutional Court to make a difference, where possible,
in the protection of children’s rights. While the historical context to this
development is perhaps unique, there are many lessons for other
jurisdictions to learn as to how to give greater constitutional effect to
children’s rights. 
What remains challenging – in South Africa as elsewhere - is the
translation of these constitutional children’s rights principles into the
reality of children’s lives. As the 2016 Concluding Observations on South
Africa’s state party report shows, South Africa’s record in the
implementation of the Convention is poor, with substantial gaps in the
protection and promotion of children’s rights across many aspects of
their lives.119 The Committee’s Observations draw attention to the
fundamental breaches of children’s substantive rights in South Africa,
while its recommendations highlight the need for widespread structural
and institutional reform designed to secure better protection and
promotion of children’s rights across the state party. It is difficult not to
despair that such inequality and injustice continues to exist in a country
with such an impressive and long record in the constitutionalisation of
children’s rights. Here it is important to remember that the
constitutionalising children’s rights is the beginning not the end of the
journey of giving effect to children’s rights and even where the
Constitution sets a high watermark, law and policy must also align with
the Convention’s comprehensive, inclusive and rights-based approach to
children’s rights if rights are to be translated into the kind of political
action that enriches the lives of children in their families and
communities. Research has highlighted the value of adopting non-legal
measures of implementation, including children’s rights budgeting, the
allocation of resources, national plans for children and the creation of
national human rights institutions as measures capable of building a
culture of respect for children’s rights that is meaningful and lasting.120
Only when political and constitutional change combine, therefore, can
respect for children’s rights be truly transformative. In South Africa, as
elsewhere, this is an ongoing process.
119 See Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding observations of the
Committee on the Rights of the Child: South Africa, CRC/C/ZAF/CO/2, (2016).
120 Kilkelly, U. (2019).
